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SIMULATING THE IMPACT OF POLICY UPON CHRONIC AND
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SUMMARY
Anti-poverty programs often seek to improve their impact by targeting households
for assistance according to one or more criteria. Since such targeting criteria are
often based upon measurements of welfare in a single time period, they tend to be
chosen to provide an indication of the long-run level of welfare. However a
growing literature shows the importance to poor households of fluctuations in
their welfare from month to month and year to year.  This paper measures the
extent to which poverty is caused by fluctuations in welfare as well as the long-
run level of welfare, using the IFPRI household food security panel which tracked
686 households from rural Pakistan between 1986/76 to 1990/91.  The article
compares the poverty impact of policies designed to increase mean incomes
(‘growth’ policies) and those designed to even out fluctuations of income over
time (‘smoothing policies’) after making an explicit adjustment for measurement
error.  Since the majority of poverty in our sample is transitory, large reductions
in poverty can be achieved by interventions designed to ‘smooth’ incomes, but
reducing chronic poverty in the long-term will require large and sustained growth
in household incomes.  The income generation process is then modelled as a
function of household characteristics and the resulting model is used to estimate
the poverty impact of a range of interventions including transfer policies and
measures designed to build human and physical capital.
I INTRODUCTION
Anti-poverty programs often seek to improve their impact by targeting households for
assistance according to one or more criteria.  Such targeting criteria are often based upon
measurements of key welfare indicators, such as income, in a single time period. This can
result in the inclusion within the target group of transitorily poor households who are
suffering from temporary misfortunes but who would not be considered poor when
judged according to their permanent income. Similarly, chronically poor households,
whose long-run income falls below the poverty line, may be excluded from the target
group due to temporary good fortune.3
A growing literature shows the importance to poor households of such fluctuations in
their welfare from month to month and year to year.
1  Where consistent measures of
household welfare are available for more than one period, it is possible to quantify the
extent to which poverty is caused by fluctuations in welfare (transitory poverty) as well as
low levels of welfare in the long-term (chronic poverty) [Jalan and Ravallion, 1998].  The
relative size of chronic and transitory poverty is clearly of importance to policymakers
since the interventions appropriate for reducing transitory poverty may be quite different
from those needed to combat chronic poverty.
This paper uses a five-year panel of 686 households to investigate the magnitude of
chronic and transitory income poverty in rural Pakistan.  Income fluctuations at the
household level are shown to remain an important part of overall poverty even after
potential measurement error in the income variable is, at least partially, accounted for.
The impact of two types of stylised policy simulations (those designed to smooth incomes
over time, and those designed to promote income growth) on the severity of chronic and
transitory poverty is then examined together with the effect of certain transfer policies and
measures designed to build human and physical capital. These simulations show that
interventions which enable households to smooth their incomes over time might achieve
large reductions in transitory poverty, while certain transfer and investment policies could
substantially reduce both chronic and transitory poverty.  However, the redistribution of
physical assets (land and livestock) would have relatively small impacts on either chronic
or transitory poverty in the study area.4
The next section describes the methodology we use to estimate the chronic and transitory
poverty paying special attention to the extent to which these estimates are inflated by
measurement error in the welfare variable (equivalised income).  It also details the impact
of different levels of smoothing of incomes on aggregate chronic and transitory poverty.
The following section describes the study area, data and the derivation of our poverty
line.  This is followed by presentation of our policy simulations and the assessment of the
efficacy of transfer and investment policies in reducing poverty.  A final section
concludes.
II METHODOLOGY
When defining aggregate chronic and transitory poverty we have adopted the
decomposition proposed by Jalan and Ravallion [Jalan and Ravallion, 1998].  They define
household poverty as:
Pi = P(yi1, yi2, ... ,yiT)   (1)
where yit is a measure of household i’s welfare (which it may be useful to think of as
income) at time t, and there are T periods in which it is measured.  P is some well defined
poverty measure, such as those in the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke class of poverty measures
[Foster, et al., 1984].  Thus using the squared poverty gap measure, they define household




































z is the poverty line, and the value of a is a measure of inequality aversion.
2
A household’s chronic poverty is then defined to be:
Ci= P(Et(yit)) (4)
that is the poverty associated with the household’s mean income over the T periods. This
can be written as the expectation over time of the household’s chronic poverty at each
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and Et[yit] is the expected value over time of the income of household i.  The transitory
poverty of household i, Ti is then defined to be the residual Pi – Ci.6
The Jalan and Ravallion measures of chronic and transitory poverty can be used with any
continuous monotonic welfare variable with consumption expenditure or income being
the most commonly used variables.  There has been considerable debate over whether
consumption expenditure or income represent the better measure of welfare (see
[Ravallion, 1992] for some of the arguments). In determining the balance between
policies designed to increase the level of welfare and those designed to cushion welfare
shocks, practical policy will obviously want to take into account the extent to which
households already have access to means of consumption smoothing – consequently
whenever this information is available it makes more sense to use consumption
expenditure in such circumstances.  Unfortunately, in the Pakistan panel we use for these
calculations, consistent and reliable information on households’ expenditures were only
collected for three out of five years.  In contrast information on incomes were collected
for all five years of the panel, so we restrict our attention to estimates of chronic and
transitory poverty using equivalised incomes as the welfare measure.
The calculation of transitory poverty using income as the welfare measure tends to result
in higher levels of poverty being found than the same calculation using consumption.
3
The reason for this is that income tends to be considerably more volatile than
consumption and the expected value of poverty rises with the riskiness of the welfare
indicator (see [Ravallion, 1988] for a comprehensive analysis of expected poverty under
risk-induced welfare variability).
However, income also tends to be more variable than consumption because of
measurement error.  While consumption expenditures are also susceptible to7
measurement error, the manner in which many surveys in developing countries are
undertaken tend to mean that consumption is more accurately measured than income.
4  In
developed country datasets, measurement error in income typically arises due to a
tendency for respondents to under-report their true income because of concerns about use
of the data for taxation assessment purposes.  In developing countries taxation systems
tend to be less well developed and so measurement error more often results from the
difficulties of accounting for the imputed value of own-account production.
Consequently we should be concerned that some of the additional poverty measured using
income as the welfare variable may simply be the result of contamination of the welfare
measure with measurement error.
To illustrate, consider a ‘true’ income variable y
* to which a measurement error m has
been added to yield to observed income variable y. i.e.  m y y
* + = .
5  Let y
* have mean
* y m  and variance 
2
y
* s  and let the measurement error have a zero mean, variance 
2
m s and
be uncorrelated with the ‘true’ income.  The variance of the observed income variable,
2
y s , is then simply the sum of the true income variance and the variance of the
measurement error.
In surveys in which both consumption and income data have been collected it is possible
to construct an estimate of the extent of measurement error by exploiting the fact that
consumption and income tend to be well correlated and therefore can be used as
instruments for each other in econometric models.
6  We therefore construct a simple
model in which the ‘true’ real adult equivalent income of household i in year t (i.e.,
uncorrupted by measurement error), y
*
it, is a function only of its value in the previous
year – that is:8
it
*
1 t , i
*
it y y e r + = - (6)
where eit is an error term which is assumed to be uncorrelated with past income.  If
income is measured with error, then estimating this model using measured income will
















m is the variance
of the measurement error and s
2
y is the variance of observed income.  However, an
unbiased estimate of r can be obtained by estimating the model using consumption in










then provides an estimate




y.   We estimate this ratio using both consumption and
lagged income as instruments in order to obtain an indication of the magnitude of
measurement error.
Once an estimate of the extent to which measured income is contaminated with
measurement error has been obtained, it is necessary to estimate how it affects our
calculations of chronic and transitory poverty.  Since the measurement error is, by its
nature unknown, it is not possible merely to ‘undo’ its affects.  However, it is possible to
construct an adjusted income variable which shares the same estimated mean as the true
income variable but has the estimated variance of the true income variable rather than that
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where  i y is the inter-temporal mean of the observed income of household i and  * y s  is the
standard deviation of  “true” income.  Under the assumption above that the measurement
error has a zero mean, the expected value of  i y  is equal to the expected value of true
income; deviations from this expected value are scaled by the estimated ratio of the
standard deviation of true income to the standard deviation of observed income.
Calculating chronic and transitory poverty measures using adjusted income can therefore
give an indication of the extent to which our estimates of poverty are inflated by the
presence of measurement error.
The Impact of Policy upon Chronic and Transitory Poverty
After taking into account the influence of measurement error, it is possible to simulate the
impact of different policies upon chronic and transient poverty using Jalan and
Ravallion’s measure of aggregate intertemporal poverty.  Initially, we focus on two broad
categories of policies, those designed to raise the mean incomes of households (‘growth
promoting policies’) and those designed to even out their fluctuation over time
(‘smoothing policies’).  Growth policies may be thought of as policies which aim to
reduce poverty by producing distributionally neutral growth in household incomes.
7  They
would include sectoral investments in human and physical capital not targeted at specific
sections of the population.  Smoothing policies would include measures such as safety
nets, micro-credit and insurance schemes that are designed to ‘smooth’ the incomes of the
poor.
8
For growth promoting policies the simulation can be done simply by considering the
impact of increasing the real adult equivalent income of all households.  We therefore10
look at the impact upon chronic and transitory poverty of applying arbitrary increments of
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where g is the percentage shift in household i’s adjusted income.
9
For smoothing policies, a set of simple moving average filters is applied to the
intertemporal adjusted income of each household.  These allow us to assess the possibility
of households being able to smooth their incomes (with no change in their overall mean)
over different numbers of years.  It may be helpful to explain the moving average filters
used in our simulations sequentially.  First consider the introduction of a policy which
allows households to smooth their incomes such that their new set of incomes over time
is the average of their current income and the income of the previous year.  This means
that we replace our T period series of income measures for each household with a set of
T-1 two-period averages of income.  Next consider an intervention which allows
households to smooth over three periods, creating a set of T-2 three-period averages of
income.  This can be continued until we have complete smoothing with a single value for
each household equal to the inter-temporal average of income for the duration of the














s is the smoothed income series and s is the number of periods over which
income is smoothed.
Clearly such smoothing will reduce transitory poverty by reducing the size of income
fluctuations as well as preventing incomes falling below the poverty line for some
households. Jalan and Ravallion’s aggregate measures of total, chronic and transitory











which is the same as equation (2) except that the expectation over time is of p
s
it, the total
poverty of household i in period t after income has been smoothed for s periods.
10  The
total poverty of household i in period t after income has been smoothed for s periods can































it is defined in equation (9) above.12
The chronic poverty of household i after s periods of income smoothing is exactly as
described by equation (5) above except that the expectation over time is of a
s
it instead of
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Transitory poverty may then again be calculated as the residual Ti = Pi – Ci. In the
simulations reported below, we calculate the reduction in total, chronic and transitory
poverty for different lengths of smoothing period s.
Smoothing incomes using even a two-year moving average filter constitutes a very high
level of intertemporal transfers.  It would therefore be useful to design a filter which
could capture different degrees of income smoothing.  The simplest way to do this is to
amend equation (9) above by using two-period smoothing with a smoothing parameter g.
The income series, ait
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it (14)13
When g=0 there is no smoothing whereas when g=1 we have perfect two period
smoothing. Thus by varying g between zero and one, it is possible to simulate different
degrees of income smoothing.
11
In the simulations reported below, we explore the reductions in total, chronic and
transitory poverty that would result from different degrees of smoothing (i.e. different
values of g) over just two time periods.  The reductions from such smoothing policies are
then compared with the reductions arising from interventions intended to raise mean
incomes via (distributionally neutral) growth.  Strictly this comparison requires a measure
of the costs of pursuing growth promoting and income smoothing policies.  However, in
the absence of reliable data on such costs, we assume that both growth and smoothing
policies may be achieved costlessly.  Clearly this is an unrealistic assumption, but the
differential impact of adopting these two types of policies are so stark, that we believe
this is still a useful, illustrative exercise.
The income growth and income smoothing simulations, while useful, are clearly rather
stylised. It is also possible to simulate the impact of a set of transfer policies that aim to
transfer productive assets (such as land, livestock or human capital) to the poor, policies
such as those affecting household composition, education, and access to key productive
assets.  In order to do this it is necessary to model the process of income determination.
Because we are interested in both chronic and transitory poverty, we estimate two related
models: firstly a regression of the inter-temporal mean of each households’ income
against a variety of household characteristics (including geographical, demographic,
educational and asset variables) is performed to understand the relative influence of
different characteristics on the average level of income; secondly the inter-temporal14
standard deviation of income is regressed against the same set of characteristics in order
to understand their influence upon fluctuations in income.  The models are described in
the section on results below.
The resulting econometric models were then used to calculate the predicted mean income
and its standard deviation for each household given its characteristics.  These were used
to modify the mean and standard deviation of adjusted income for each household in a
similar manner to the way in which real income was adjusted for measurement error in
equation (7).  The resulting income series was then used to calculate chronic and
transitory poverty.  A set of interventions involving various transfer and investment
policies were then simulated to examine how aggregate chronic and transitory poverty
would be affected.
III THE IFPRI PAKISTAN PANEL
The data set used in this paper is taken from a panel data survey of around 800
households in 52 villages in rural Pakistan conducted by the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) between July 1986 and October 1991.  Each household in the
survey was interviewed a total of fourteen times between these dates, although due to the
uneven spacing of visits it has only been possible to construct a panel for five annual
rounds.  Data collection took place in three provinces: Punjab, Sind and North-West
Frontier Province (NWFP), and within each Province in one purposively sampled least
developed district (Attock in Punjab, Badin in Sind and Dir in NWFP).  In Punjab, a
second more prosperous district, Faisalabad was also included in the panel as a control.
Originally, the IFPRI team had also planned to include one least developed district15
(Kalat) from Pakistan’s fourth province, Baluchistan, but survey work had to be
suspended in this district after one year due to ‘special logistic conditions in that
province’ [Adams and He, 1995].  So the final sample that we have available contains
households from 52 villages in four districts and three provinces.  It should be stressed
that this sample cannot be regarded as representative of Pakistan, but, with the exception
of Faisalabad, may be representative of poor rural areas within Pakistan.
The IFPRI survey collected information on households’ composition and characteristics,
their land ownership and use, crop production and distribution together with asset
ownership.  A specific concern of the study was to document rural households’ sources of
income and the factors driving changes in income inequality [Adams and He, 1995].
Unfortunately, although detailed information on household expenditures were collected
during the first three years of the panel, the procedures used to collect information on
expenditure in the last two years of the panel are not comparable to those in the previous
three years.  Estimating consumption expenditures accurately for the panel is also
problematic because different rounds of the survey used different recall periods even
within its first three years.  So our attention in this paper is restricted to poverty measures
based on equivalised incomes.
12  A number of studies using the first-three years of the
panel [Alderman, 1996; Gillani, 1996] have found that the study households experience
difficulties in smoothing consumption (especially after repeated shocks) and very little
risk-sharing occurs between individuals who are not related even within villages.  So our
use of income as a long-term welfare measure, while imperfect, may be less problematic
than in other developing country settings.  In addition, we take explicit account of
measurement errors in income when estimating the extent of chronic and transitory
poverty in the panel.16
In contrast to consumption expenditures, we are able to ‘track’ the incomes, assets and
household characteristics of 686 household over all five years of the sample.  Together
with its geographical coverage this places the IFPRI panel in between the large-scale
panels constructed from national sample surveys in China, Ethiopia and India with 3,000
or more households, and smaller micro-panels constructed for specific studies such as the
ICRISAT panel in southern India, Muller’s [1997] work in Rwanda, [Kinsey et al., 1998]
in Zimbabwe, and [Scott and Litchfield, 1994] in Chile.  It is also important to recognise
that unlike many data sets described as panels (including the majority of the World
Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Studies), the IFPRI panel allows for households to
be tracked between more than two points in time.  This enables the comparison of
policies designed to increase average incomes with those designed to smooth incomes
over different lengths of time – which is done later in the next section.
The means and standard deviations of adult equivalent income and the household
composition, educational and asset variables used in our subsequent analysis are shown in
Appendix 2.  It will be noted that equivalised incomes decline over the five-years of the
panel reflecting a general increasing trend in rural poverty in Pakistan during the period
[UNDP Pakistan, 1999; UNDP, 1998]. This trend is, however, likely to be accentuated
due to ageing and lifecycle effects increasing household size (itself reflecting the rising
proportion of children under 6 and between 6 and 15) in our panel households.  While
land ownership is quite stable, there is some tendency for accumulation of other assets
such as jewellery and vehicle ownership.17
All previous studies using the IFPRI Pakistan panel have used a relative poverty line set
equal to the bottom quintile of the distribution of either incomes or consumption
expenditures [Alderman and Garcia, 1993; Adams and He, 1995].  Although this differs
from the way in which the Pakistan Household Income and Expenditure Survey sets its
poverty line, the adoption of a relative poverty line may be justified in two ways.
13  First,
there is no clear basket of goods to use within the sample districts/villages for
constructing a poverty line using the cost of basic needs method.  Second, when the
alternative food energy intake method is used, the level of expenditure required for an
individual to acquire Kcal 2,100 per day turns out to be remarkably similar to the bottom
quintile of the per capita consumption distribution.  Furthermore, as Alderman and Garcia
argue, in the first three years of the panel the consumption and income distributions of the
panel are so well correlated that the cut-offs from their distributions may be used
interchangeably. Our poverty line was therefore set equal to the bottom quintile of the per
adult equivalent income distribution in the first year of the panel – a figure of Rupees
2,000 per adult equivalent unit.
IV RESULTS
We present our results in three sections: first we show the relative magnitude of chronic
and transitory poverty; second the relative impact upon poverty of policies to promote
income growth and policies to facilitate income smoothing are explored; and, finally the
poverty impact of a variety of transfer and investment policies is described.
The Magnitude Of Chronic And Transitory Poverty
It is useful to start by exploring the extent to which households experience chronic and
transitory poverty.  One way in which this can be done is to look at the number of18
households experiencing poverty.  Table 1 shows the number of years households
experienced poverty during the five year period of the panel.  Note that these years are not
necessarily consecutive – for example, a household experiencing three years of poverty
during the five year period might experience them in the first, fourth and fifth years of the
survey. Table 1 shows that almost 60 per cent of the households in the panel have some
experience of poverty. However, a quarter are only in poverty for one year whilst over a
third are in poverty for two or more years. Only 3 per cent of the sample households had
incomes below the poverty line in all five years of the panel.
Table 1: Number of Households Experiencing Different Periods of Poverty






0 (i.e. never poor) 290 42 %
1 163 24 %
2 100 15 %
3 68 10 %
44 7 7  %
5 (i.e. always poor) 18 3 %
Note: There are 686 households in the survey. Percentages do not add up to 100 per
cent due to rounding.
Table 1 suggests that income poverty is predominantly transitory.  To examine this
further we calculated aggregate total, chronic and transitory poverty using the Jalan and
Ravallion measures described in Section II.  The results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Total, Chronic and Transitory Poverty using Observed Income
Total Poverty Chronic Poverty Transitory Poverty
a=0 (Headcount) 0.249 0.152 0.097




The total poverty headcount is 25 per cent – this is the average percentage of households
below the poverty line during the five years of the panel. About 15 per cent of households
have average incomes below the poverty line; the remaining 9 per cent of ‘headcount
poverty’ resulting from households with average incomes above the poverty line who
temporarily fall into poverty.  The proportion of the total poverty gap accounted for by
transitory poverty is greater since the gap between households’ average income and the
poverty line is 3 per cent of the poverty line, but the average shortfall below the poverty
line is 8 per cent of the poverty line – the remaining 5 per cent resulting from the
variability of income.
14  Similarly with the squared poverty gap, transitory poverty
constitutes over 80 per cent of total poverty.  Thus if one is particularly concerned with
the poorest of the poor, Table 2 appears to show that most of the squared poverty gap
results from fluctuations of income rather than average income levels.
To what extent is the dominant role ascribed to transitory poverty resulting from errors in
the measurement of income?  To assess this the simple autoregressive model of income
described in the Section II was estimated; the same model was then re-estimated using
consumption as an instrument using the first three years of the panel.  The parameter
estimates on lagged income from the two regressions were then combined to provide an
estimate of the ratio of the variance of measurement error to the variance of income of
0.43.
15  Given that the variance of observed income is equal to the sum of the variance of
‘true income’ and the variance of measurement error, a value of 0.43 indicates that the
variance of measurement error is around three-quarters of the variance of the true income
indicator.  Thus measurement error is playing an important role in inflating the estimates
of the transitory poverty using observed income in Table 2.20
The income variable was scaled in the manner described in the Section II in order to
produce an adjusted income variable with the same mean but with variance equal to the
estimated variance of the true income variable.  We recognise that this is an approximate
adjustment, but nonetheless we believe that it is important to attempt to estimate the
approximate size of the bias induced by measurement error upon our estimates of poverty.
Table 3 shows our estimates of total, chronic and transitory poverty using the adjusted
income variable.21
Table 3:  Total, Chronic and Transitory Poverty using Adjusted Income
Total Poverty Chronic Poverty Transitory Poverty
a=0 (Headcount) 0.212 0.153 0.059




Chronic poverty remains unchanged when using adjusted income since the mean income
of each household is unaltered. However, total poverty using all three measures is
approximately halved due to a large reduction in transitory poverty.  This is unsurprising
given that the adjustment of the income variable involved a reduction in its variance, and
emphasises the importance of accounting for measurement error in panel data.
Nonetheless, 47 per cent  of the total poverty gap and 68 per cent of the total squared
poverty gap is still accounted for by transitory poverty.
The Poverty Impact Of Growth And Smoothing Policies
Poverty reduction policies often focus upon improving poor households’ endowments of
those elements of human and physical capital found to be most strongly associated with
poverty.  Such policies can be characterised as aiming to promote income growth, since
the assumption is that improved endowments will enable those households to increase
their productivity or earning capacity. The impact of economic growth on chronic and
transitory poverty can be simulated directly by increasing household incomes.  In the
following empirical results, we focus on the squared poverty gap measure only, both for
simplicity and because of the well known desirable properties of this poverty measure
[Ravallion, 1992].  The effect on total, chronic and transitory poverty of increasing
incomes by between 10 and 50 per cent are shown in Figure 1.
1622
Figure 1: The effect of income growth on chronic and transitory poverty
Note: Shift in the mean indicates the proportionate shift in the mean income. Thus the value 1.1 indicates a
ten per cent increase in the mean.
Figure 1 shows that increases in income cause large reductions in chronic poverty but has
relatively little effect upon transitory poverty.
17
How chronic and transitory poverty changes when household incomes are smoothed may
be simulated using a set of moving average filters as described above.  Figure 2 shows the
impact of perfect smoothing of incomes over different numbers of years on total, chronic
















































Figure 2: The effect of income smoothing on chronic and transitory poverty
Note: Years of smoothing indicates the number of years in the moving average filter; when this has the
value 1 there is no smoothing.
Figure 2 shows that smoothing gives a dramatic reduction in poverty with the squared
poverty gap falling by almost half from 0.031 to 0.016, due to a 70 per cent reduction in
transitory poverty by applying a two-year filter.  Since there is no change in mean
incomes, chronic poverty remains virtually unchanged over the period.
It is instructive to compare the reductions in poverty due to growth and those due to
smoothing.  Comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2 it is apparent that smoothing incomes over
two years achieves a far larger reduction in overall poverty than that achieved by most
plausible growth rates.  A two year smoothing achieves the same reduction in overall
poverty of an increase in mean real adult equivalent income of more than 50 per cent
(which with current rates of economic and population growth would not be achieved for
many years).  However, the overall reduction in poverty is achieved almost entirely


































Given the large reduction in transitory poverty resulting from smoothing using a two-
period filter, it is interesting to consider the effect of smoothing by less than this amount.
This can be done by parameterising the smoothing filter as described in the methodology.
Figure 3 shows the impact upon chronic and transitory poverty of smoothing for different
values of the smoothing parameter from zero (no smoothing) to one (perfect two-period
smoothing as above).
Figure 3: Parameterising the smoothing function
The smoothing parameter g ranges from 0 (no smoothing) to 1 (perfect two-period smoothing).  Thus the
starting values of Figure 3 are the same as for Figure 1 and Figure 2 while the finishing values are the same
as Figure 2 with two years of smoothing.
As Figure 3 shows transitory poverty is more than halved when the smoothing parameter
g = 0.3.  Thus the major part of the poverty reduction takes place with a relatively low
level of the smoothing parameter. Comparing this result with the impact of growth in
Figure 1 it is clear that smoothing with a parameter value of g=0.1 achieves
approximately the same reduction in overall poverty as that achieved by a ten per cent














































The above simulations suggest that policy makers face a dilemma: the largest reductions
in overall income poverty may best be secured through improving the ability of poor
households to smooth incomes over time; however, chronic poverty will persist in rural
Pakistan without large and sustained growth in incomes.  Thus the balance between
interventions to improve households’ abilities to smooth incomes over time and those
designed to promote growth must depend not only on the effectiveness of each type of
intervention but on the relative weight which policymakers place upon the welfare of the
chronically versus the transitorily poor.
The Poverty Impact Of Transfer And Investment Policies
The simulations above are highly stylised.  Real policy interventions take many different
forms including investments in human and physical capital, improved access to services
and credit, support for particular vulnerable groups and so forth.  Such interventions are
likely to have an impact upon both chronic and transitory poverty.  However, in order to
assess the likely effectiveness of any particular intervention in reducing income poverty it
is necessary to characterise the income generation process and to identify the relative
importance of the factors determining income.  The reduced form income equation is
shown in equation (15):
ln(ai×) = k + b.HCi× + c.Educi× +d.Landi× + f.Assetsi× + g.DVilli  +  eit
18 (15)
where i indexes the household and × represents an average over the years of the survey; ai×
is the average per adult equivalent income of household i; k is a constant; HCi× represents
a vector of household composition variables indicating the proportion of household26
members in each of a set of age-sex categories; Educi× is a vector of educational variables
including the proportion of members of the household with basic and secondary
education and the highest level of education achieved by the household head; Landi× is a
vector of land ownership variables; Assetsi× is a vector of asset variables including the
value of livestock, vehicles and jewellery owned; DVilli is a vector of dummy variables
for each of the 52 villages in the panel and; eit is an error term which is assumed to be
independent and identically distributed.  Village dummies are included to take account of
village specific shocks which may affect the incomes of all households in a particular
village.  Estimation used the panel ‘between’ estimator
19; the regression results are shown
in Table 4.
Table 4 shows that households which have a high proportion of members under the age of
16 tend to have substantially lower incomes than those which do not.  In particular the
proportion of children between the ages of 6 and 15 have a strongly negative effect upon
a household’s real adult equivalent income while the proportion of children under six
years old has a much smaller effect.  This is partially a consequence of using equivalised
incomes as the welfare measure – since the addition of a young child has a much bigger
impact upon per capita income than it does on per adult equivalent income.  However, it
also suggests that, although older children in rural Pakistan typically contribute to
household income, they remain a net cost to the household (in the sense that if one were
to ‘add’ an older child to an average household, the real adult equivalent income of the
household would decline).  This is particularly true for boys, which may reflect the fact
that boys receive substantially more schooling than girls in rural Pakistan [Sawada,
1999].27
Table 4: Regression of Log Real Adult Equivalent Mean Income on Household
Variables
n = 681
F( 59,   621) =   11.81
Prob > F =  0.0000
R-sq within   =  0.0126
between  =  0.5288
overall  =  0.3744
Variable coeff
 Robust 
std err t-stat Prob > t
Proportion of household members 
consisting of:
  males aged 6-15 -0.7026 0.1516 -4.635 0.000
  children aged less than 6 -0.1330 0.1212 -1.097 0.273
  females aged 6-15 -0.5704 0.1518 -3.758 0.000
  males with basic education 0.1008 0.1397 0.721 0.471
  males with secondary education 0.7739 0.1948 3.973 0.000
  females with basic education 0.0034 0.1551 0.022 0.982
  females with secondary education 0.7912 0.6081 1.301 0.194
Household head has basic education 0.1240 0.0405 3.065 0.002
Acres of rainfed land owned 0.0021 0.0018 1.189 0.235
Acres of irrigated land owned 0.0113 0.0019 6.067 0.000
Value of livestock owned 0.0032 0.0013 2.385 0.017
Value of vehicles owned 0.0026 0.0016 1.647 0.100
Value of jewelry owned 0.0054 0.0021 2.624 0.009
Value of household assets owned 0.0006 0.0002 3.259 0.001
Household owns a tractor 0.3449 0.1024 3.370 0.001
Constant 7.8037 0.1034 75.461 0.000
Note: OLS panel estimation using the ‘between estimator’.  Village dummies have been omitted to clarify the presentation.  Five
households with particularly high leverage were omitted from the regression.
The proportion of household members who have basic or secondary education is strongly
associated with higher incomes; secondary education in particular has a strong impact
upon income.  These results hold for both males and females, but it is notable that having
a higher proportion of females with basic education has a much smaller impact upon
household real adult equivalent income than the same proportion of educated males.  This
may reflect the marginal role women play in market oriented activities in rural Pakistan
[Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 1997].  Whether the household head has (at least) basic
education also has a strong positive impact upon income.28
Not surprisingly, the value of physical assets owned has a strong positive influence upon
income.  Both rainfed and irrigated land contribute positively to income, but the influence
of irrigated land is much stronger.  Similarly, the value of livestock, vehicles, jewellery
and other household assets contribute positively and significantly to household income
and households which own a tractor are also likely to have substantially larger incomes.
However, we are conscious that these variables suffer from potential endogeneity
problems – it is not clear whether a household is better off because it holds a large
amount of irrigated land, or whether it has a large amount of land because it is better off.
If our data set contained a set of variables which could be treated as exogenous to both
income and asset ownership then it would be possible to account for such problems using
either instrumental variable or simultaneous equation methods.  However, such variables
are not readily available, so we treat the results for the asset variables with a certain
degree of caution.
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The above income regression gives an indication of the relationship between household
characteristics and the mean level of income.  Given that transitory poverty is important
we also estimated the relationship between household characteristics and fluctuations in
income by regressing the log of the inter-temporal standard deviation of (adjusted) real
income against the same household characteristics.  The results are shown in Table 5.29
Table 5: Regression of Log Inter-temporal Standard Deviation of Real Adult
Equivalent Income on Household Variables
n = 681
F( 60,   620) =   18.95
Prob > F =  0.0000
R-sq between  =  0.6471
Variable coeff
 Robust 
std err t-stat Prob > t
Log mean real income 1.0689 0.0479 22.328 0.000
Proportion of household members 
consisting of:
  males aged 6-15 -0.1516 0.1841 -0.823 0.411
  children aged less than 6 -0.3457 0.1449 -2.386 0.017
  females aged 6-15 -0.3104 0.1834 -1.693 0.091
  males with basic education -0.2867 0.1668 -1.719 0.086
  males with secondary education -0.5539 0.2352 -2.355 0.019
  females with basic education 0.2098 0.1850 1.134 0.257
  females with secondary education 0.8313 0.7265 1.144 0.253
Household head has basic education 0.0323 0.0487 0.664 0.507
Acres of rainfed land owned 0.0014 0.0022 0.656 0.512
Acres of irrigated land owned -0.0017 0.0023 -0.727 0.467
Value of livestock owned -0.0001 0.0016 -0.068 0.946
Value of vehicles owned 0.0019 0.0019 1.009 0.314
Value of jewelry owned 0.0010 0.0025 0.389 0.697
Value of household assets owned 0.0001 0.0002 0.458 0.647
Household owns a tractor -0.0477 0.1230 -0.387 0.699
Constant -1.5554 0.3964 -3.923 0.000
Note: We have included log inter-temporal mean income as an explanatory variable to account for heteroskedasticity in real income.
Village dummies have been omitted to clarify the presentation.  Five households with particularly high leverage were omitted from
the regression. Method of estimation is OLS.
Table 5 shows that the inter-temporal standard deviation of income rises with the inter-
temporal mean of income.  Furthermore, having a high proportion of children in the
household reduces the variability of income – thus households with high dependency
ratios are not only poorer, but also have more stable incomes perhaps indicating a greater
degree of chronic poverty among this group.  Having a larger proportion of males with
basic or secondary education reduces income variability, but having a larger proportion of
females with such education increases it.  This may reflect the differing income earning30
opportunities for men and women, with men having greater access to a diversity of
income sources reducing total income variability.
As would be expected, an increase in the area of rainfed land owned increases the
standard deviation of income while ownership of irrigated land reduces variability.
Similarly, livestock and tractor ownership decreases the variation in income but owning
vehicles, jewellery and other household assets increases it.  However, all of these effects
are small and none are statistically significant.
Transfer and Investment Policy Simulations
The above models of mean income and the standard deviation of income were used to
simulate the impact of various transfer and investment policies upon poverty.  First, the
mean income model was used to calculate the predicted mean income of each household.
Second, the inter-temporal standard deviation of income for each household was
estimated using the second model.  The estimated mean and standard deviation were then
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where ait is adjusted income,  i a is the inter-temporal mean of adjusted income and 
i a s  is
the inter-temporal standard deviation for household i;   i a ˆ  is the estimate of the inter-
temporal mean of income from the income regression and 
i a ˆ s  is the estimated inter-
temporal standard deviation.  We prefer to construct the new income variable in this way
rather than simply use the estimate from the income regression since the new variable31
more accurately reflects the impact of policy upon both the mean and the standard
deviation of income.
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The mean income and standard deviation models were used to predict the impact of a
number of different policies upon the mean and standard deviation of each household’s
income.  For each policy a new income variable was constructed and used to calculate
total, chronic and transitory poverty.
22  Table 6 shows the poverty impact of a range of
transfer and investment policies.
Table 6:  Transfer and Investment Policy Simulations
Total Poverty Chronic Poverty Transitory Poverty
Base Case 0.0251 0.0023 0.0228
Policy Simulations












- all get the mean 0.0316 0.0020 0.0296




Note: The poverty figures are for the average squared poverty gap in each case.
Using the new income variable to calculate poverty gives an average squared poverty gap
of 0.025, similar to the 0.028 calculated using adjusted income in Table 3.
23  As before,
transitory poverty dominates.  Turning to the policy simulations, Tables 4 and 5 suggest32
that households with a high proportion of children in the household tend to be poorer.
This might be addressed through implementing a child benefit scheme which supplies
additional assistance to households with a high proportion of children.  Such schemes
typically involve the provision of income in-kind rather than cash and can be
administered in a variety of ways including school feeding programmes, distribution to
mothers as part of post-natal health care as well as distribution to households targeted by
their dependency ratio.
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We abstract from the details of any particular scheme and simulate a generic scheme in
which each child under the age of six receives an annual benefit equivalent to Rupees 100
(in 1986 prices).  It is assumed that such a scheme is paid for either by government or by
those whose incomes are permanently and significantly above the poverty line, so that the
need to pay for the scheme does not impact upon our poverty calculations.  Delivering
this relatively modest benefit to each child under the age of six each year reduces the
predicted squared poverty gap from 0.025 to 0.018.  Most of the reduction comes from
lowering transitory poverty, but chronic poverty is also more than halved.  This suggests
that schemes which support households with high dependency ratios can be effective in
reducing poverty.
Our next policy experiment explores the consequence of investing in education.  On
average a quarter of the members of each household are males with no education; a third
are females with no education.  We therefore consider separately the impact of giving
males and females basic education.  The results are shown in Table 6.   The results
suggest that improving basic male education would reduce poverty by 26 per cent with
the transitory poverty experiencing a greater proportionate reduction than chronic33
poverty.  However, improving female education actually increases poverty reflecting the
positive coefficient on basic female education in the standard deviation model. This
perverse result is likely to be due to the limited opportunities for higher income
employment for educated females in rural Pakistan.  It should be stressed that it is
unlikely that the same result would apply to other measures of social welfare such as
infant and child mortality where female education has been found to be important.
By contrast, promoting basic education among the 63 per cent of household heads with no
education has a substantial impact upon poverty.  As with child benefit most of the
reduction comes from lowering transitory poverty, but chronic poverty experiences a
much larger proportionate fall.  The large poverty impact of educating the household head
may be because households’ income generation strategies are often principally
determined by the (almost invariably male) household head.  Thus their education not
only impacts upon their own ability to bring income into the household, but also upon the
likely success of the activities undertaken by others.
Land distribution in rural Pakistan is extremely unequal (the Gini coefficient of land
ownership in our sample is 0.78).  Consequently land redistribution is often suggested as
a poverty reduction policy on the grounds that if all households had access to land then
they would all be able earn at least a minimal income [Besley and Burgess, 1998; Putzel,
1998].  We explored the impact of such an asset transfer policy through two different
simulations on the structure of land ownership.  First all households were allocated the
mean acreage of rainfed and canal irrigated land in the district in which they lived.
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Second households were allocated two acres of the most prevalent type of land in their
district (i.e. rainfed land in Attock and Dir, and irrigated land in Faisalabad and Badin) if34
their current holding was less than this.  The first redistribution is substantial since the
mean holding is very much higher than the median in each district due to the presence of
a small number of large holdings.  Despite this, Table 6 shows that the impact upon
chronic poverty is very much less than either child benefit or the educational policy
simulations.  Moreover, transitory poverty increases due to the positive association
between holdings of rainfed land and income variability, so that the total squared poverty
gap rises.  The smaller but more realistic distribution of two acres of land to all
households with less than this holding has virtually no effect upon income poverty.  Thus,
although land redistribution may have other beneficial effects (such as improving the
security and status of poor households), our simulations suggest that it is not a panacea
for reducing income poverty.
Finally, we simulate the impact of transfer of livestock by giving all households a value
of livestock equal to the mean value within their district.  Whilst a similar policy was
found to be effective in reducing poverty in southern India [Singh and Hazell, 1993], we
find that this has a very small impact upon both chronic and transitory income poverty in
our Pakistan panel.
V CONCLUSIONS
Anti-poverty interventions are often based on static conceptions of poverty even though it
is well-known that household living standards vary over time.  This paper has
investigated the magnitude of chronic and transitory poverty using a five-year panel
survey from rural Pakistan.  Applying the Jalan and Ravallion measures of chronic and
transitory poverty to observed income suggests that over 80 per cent of the total squared35
poverty gap is transitory.  Adjusting, at least partially, for potential measurement error in
the income variable reduces this figure to 68 per cent, but the poverty resulting from
income fluctuations still remains a large and important part of total poverty.
Different types of anti-poverty interventions may be needed to address chronic and
transitory poverty.  We therefore examine the impact of two types of stylised anti-poverty
interventions on the chronic and transitory poverty.  Our simulations show that
interventions which enable households to smooth their incomes over time achieve a large
reduction in transitory poverty and therefore, given the relative importance of this type of
poverty, in total poverty.  This finding remains valid even when the extent of smoothing
is quite small.  However, simulated ‘smoothing’ makes little difference to chronic
poverty, which is reduced only by large and sustained growth in real incomes.
We then extend these simulations by modelling both the income generation process and
income variability.  The resulting models are then used to simulate the impact upon
chronic and transitory poverty of a series of transfer and investment policies.  We show
that the provision of a child benefit of Rs 100 to each child could dramatically reduce
poverty, reflecting the high dependency ratios among households with low average
incomes.  Improving education via educational subsidies and other mechanisms also
reduces poverty, particularly education of the household head.  However, promoting basic
education among females does not reduce income poverty, suggesting strong gender
biases in the market for educated female labour in our study area.  Finally land
redistribution does not appear to reduce chronic poverty even when substantial amounts
of land are redistributed, indeed larger holdings of rainfed land are associated with greater36
transitory poverty.  Similarly, redistribution of livestock has a very small impact upon
poverty.
These findings have important implications for anti-poverty policy.  They suggest that,
while the current emphasis on sectoral (and in some countries geographical) interventions
to improve the human and physical capital of the poor are likely to be successful in the
long-run in reducing chronic poverty, in the short-term potentially much larger reductions
in aggregate income poverty might be achieved by enhancing households’ ability to
smooth incomes across time.  Interventions to achieve such improvements might include
the provision of micro-credit, seasonal public works, crop insurance and food price
stabilisation schemes.  However, the most appropriate ways of smoothing incomes will
clearly depend upon the nature of market failures in specific contexts.  Further work is
also needed to determine the extent to which such policies can smooth incomes in order
to provide policymakers with realistic forecasts of the poverty reducing impact of
different policy mixes.
In addition, the results suggest that the reduction of income poverty in rural Pakistan can
be most effectively achieved through supporting households with high proportions of
children. Promoting education, particularly of existing household heads can be critical in
helping households to formulate effective strategies for income generation.  More
controversially, in our sample of households neither female basic education nor land
redistribution appear to reduce income poverty in the short-term (although this in no way
negates their value for the achievement of other social objectives).  In the former case this
may point to the need to tackle the social or cultural barriers which, by preventing female
access to income earning opportunities, may decrease the level and increase the37
variability of income in such households.38
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Appendix 1: Adult Equivalence Scale














The equivalence scale is based on a World Health Organisation equivalence scale quoted in [Dercon, 1998].44










Real Adult Equivalent Income (Rs 
000s) 4,386 4,066 4,098 4,052
Household Composition Variables 
(Proportion of Household members)
Children aged less than 6 0.169 0.142 0.214 0.160
Females aged 6-15 0.113 0.123 0.107 0.115
Males aged 6-15 0.138 0.132 0.129 0.124
Member aged 65 or over 0.047 0.089 0.045 0.084
Household size (number of 
individuals) 8.714 4.138 9.744 4.766
Education Variables (Proportion of 
household members)
Females with basic education 0.087 0.137 (see note)
Males with basic education 0.189 0.164
Females with secondary education 0.006 0.032
Males with secondary education 0.066 0.114
Dummy for basic education of 
household head 0.369 0.483
Assets
Acres of rainfed land owned 2.931 11.128 2.867 11.223
Acres irrigated land owned 4.152 10.949 4.433 11.744
Value of livestock owned 17.422 15.813 17.422 17.738
Value of vehicle owned 1.603 14.032 2.451 15.871
Value of jewelery owned 6.978 11.94 8.719 14.270
Value of household assets owned 72.28 145.5 88.466 157.544
Dummy for tractor ownership 0.962 0.191 0.897 0.304
Notes
Based on 686 households
Basic education is defined as primary or middle school education.
Secondary education is defined as secondary or college education.
Values are in Rs 1000s
Educational variables were only collected in the first year45
NOTES
                                                
1 See the surveys by [Morduch, 1995; Besley, 1995; Townsend, 1995] for reviews of the extensive literature
on risk and consumption smoothing; [Chambers, 1989] provides an account of the importance of
vulnerability and seasonality from a participatory perspective.
2 If a=0, the measure is the poverty headcount; a=1 gives the poverty gap and a=2 the squared poverty gap.
3 If the calculation of poverty is made using a Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measure with a > 0.
4 The reverse tends to be true in richer countries [Deaton, 1997].
5 As Ravallion [1988] notes, measurement error may be more likely to be multiplicative than additive in
some situations.  In this case, the variables in the illustration should be considered as logs of the underlying
variables.
6 For example, [Altonji and Siow, 1987] use this technique to obtain unbiased estimates of the response of
consumption to changes in income.
7 Of course growth can also be pro-poor or anti-poor, but for simplicity here we focus on distributionally
neutral growth.
8 Note that we make a distinction here between smoothing incomes and smoothing consumption.  There is a
considerable literature on the ability of households to smooth consumption in developing countries
[Alderman and Paxson, 1992; Deaton, 1989; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990; Kochar, 1995; Morduch, 1994;
Rosenweig and Wolpin, 1993; Townsend, 1994] including work using the first three years of  the panel data
we use [Alderman, 1996; Gillani, 1996; Broca, 1995].
9 Note that the calculations are performed using income adjusted for measurement error.
10 The length of an income series which has been smoothed over s periods is T-s+1 rather than T periods
(for example two-period smoothing produces an income series of length T-1)
11 This type of smoothing is a special case of smoothing using a set of negative exponential weights for
incomes from all previous years.
12 Equivalised incomes were obtained by applying the standard WHO caloric equivalence scale reproduced
in Appendix 1.
13 [Malik, 1993] provides a useful survey of previous studies of poverty in Pakistan.  The most common
approach used to define a poverty line has been in terms of the consumption expenditure required to meet a
minimum per capita calorie requirement – this is the approach used by Irfan and Amjad [Irfan and Amjad,
1984], Ahmad and Allison [Ahmad and Allison, 1990] and Ercelawn [Ercelawn, 1990].  Typically a calorie
requirement of Kcal 2,550 per day is used, as suggested by the Nutrition Cell of the Planning and
Development Division of Pakistan, although lower figures such as Kcal 2,100 have also been used.
14 This is possible because the total poverty gap averages only income fluctuations below the poverty line;
the chronic poverty gap looks at the gap between the poverty line and a households average income across
the panel; this will include any income it receives above the poverty line.  If all households only received
incomes below the poverty line then total poverty gap would equal the chronic poverty gap despite any
fluctuations in income.  For this reason Jalan and Ravallion focus on the squared poverty gap rather than the
headcount and poverty gap measures, but we report all the measures here for completeness.
15 The same estimation was also done using income lagged twice as an instrument for lagged income – this
produced an estimated noise-to-signal ratio of 0.49.
16 All simulations use adjusted income rather than observed income. The poverty measure used is the
squared poverty gap.  Similar results are obtained using the headcount and poverty gap poverty measures.
17 The values shown in Figure 1 are not identical to those in Table 3 because the figure uses the last four
years of the panel to facilitate comparison with smoothing policies later.
18 We follow the standard practice of using a semi-log functional form for the income equation.
19 Pooled OLS estimation with village and time dummies gave very similar results.
20 It could also be argued that household composition and education are endogenous.  Whilst this is clearly
true in the long-term, it is unlikely to be important for the relatively short period of our panel.
21 A set of simulations was also performed using the income model only.  Predicted income was much
smoother than actual income since the income model only explains 37 per cent of the variation in the
dependent variable.  Consequently the calculations of poverty using predicted income were substantially
less than poverty calculated using actual income.
22 [Singh and Hazell, 1993] uses a similar approach to policy simulation, but does not explicitly model
variability in income.46
                                                                                                                                                
23 The figures are not identical because the new income variable gives all households their predicted mean
and standard deviation whereas the adjusted income variable uses their actual mean and standard deviation
(adjusted for measurement error).
24 The last option is often problematic due to the difficulties in identifying which children ‘belong’ to a
particular household.
25 We restricted distribution to be within district since it would not be administratively realistic to
redistribute land across different districts.